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Abstract
Rosa Helm, a female employee at the Christianburg Garment Company, filed a Title VII ac-
tion’ against her employer, charging racial discrimination.
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Rosa Helm, a female employee at the Christianburg Garment Com-
pany, filed a Title VII action' against her employer, charging racial
discrimination. The charge was filed with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission and, in 1970, the Commission notified her that
its efforts at conciliation had failed, and that she had a right to sue her
employer on her own behalf. She did not do so. In 1972, almost two
years after the Commission notified Rosa of her right to sue, Congress
amended Title VII2 and authorized the Commission to bring prompt
judicial action on its own behalf, whenever it appears necessary, to carry
out the purposes of the Act.3 The Act, as amended, was to apply to all
"charges pending with the Commission ' 4 on the effective date of the
amendments.
As a result, the Commission filed a lawsuit' against Christianburg
Garment Company, Rosa's employer, alleging that it had engaged in
unlawful employment practices in violation of the Civil Rights Act of
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, Unlawful Employment Prac-
tices - Employer Practices
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.
2. Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (March 24, 1972). The amendment gives the
Commission the power to bring civil actions against an employer where the Commission
is unable to secure a conciliation agreement from the employer to refrain from further
unlawful employment practices and to obtain voluntary compliance with the Act.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2).
4. Section 14 of Pub. L. 92-261 provides that: "The amendments made by this
Act to Section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. . ..shall be applicable with respect
to charges pending with the Commission on the date of the enactment of this Act...
and all charges filed thereafter."
5. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Christianburg Garment Co.,
Inc., 376 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Va. 1974).
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1964.6 The employer moved for summary judgment on the grounds that
Rosa Helm's charge was not "pending" on the effective date of the
amendments. The Commission contended "that charges as to which no
private suit had been brought as of the effective date of the amendments
remained 'pending' before the Commission so long as the complaint had
not been dismissed and the dispute had not been resloved through con-
ciliation." 7 The Virginia District Courts granted summary judgment on
behalf of the employer, concluding that:
[W]hen Rosa Helm was notified in 1970 that conciliation had failed and
that she had a right to sue the company, the Commission had no further
action legally open to it, and its authority over the case terminated on
that date. Section 14's reference to "pending" cases was held "to be
limited to charges still in the process of negotiation and conciliation" on
the effective date of the 1972 Amendments.?
The garment company, as the prevailing party, then petitioned the
court for an award of attorney's fees against the Commission, as pro-
vided for in Section 706(k) of Title VII. 11 The Virginia District Court,
finding that "the Commission's action in bringing the suit cannot be
characterized as unreasonable and meritless,"" refused to grant attor-
ney's fees. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 12 and certior-
ari was granted 3 by the Supreme Court. The United States Supreme
Court, in an opinion 4 expressing the unanimous view of the eight 5
participating Justices, affirmed the court of appeals' decision denying
attorney's fees to the defendant and HELD: (1) a district court can, in
its discretion, award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant pursuant
6. Supra note 1.
7. Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
434 U.S. 412, 414-15 (1978).
8. 376 F. Supp. 1067.
9. 434 U.S. at 415, n. 3.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5(k):
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States,
reasonable attorney's fee as a part of the costs, and the Commission and the
United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
II. 434 U.S. at 415.
12. 550 F. 2d 949 (4th Cir. 1977).
13. 432 U.S. 905 (1977).
14. 434 U.S. 412.
15. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
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to Section 706(k), but only upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was
"frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued
to litigate after it clearly became so,""6 (2) the district court exercised
its discretion squarely within the permissible bounds of Section 706(k)
in declining to award attorney's fees to the employer as a prevailing
defendant; 7 and (3) the Commission's action against the employer
based on its interpretation of Section 14 of Title VII was not frivolous,
unreasonable or groundless."8
In the United States, prevailing litigants are generally not entitled
to collect a reasonable attorney's fee from the losing party.1 This
"American Rule,' as it has been referred to,21 has been much criticized
and is a departure from the practice followed in England.21 There has
16. 434 U.S. at 422.
17. Id. at 424.
18. Id.
19. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). (Alyeska
expressly reaffirmed the American Rule, although certain exceptions were recognized).
20. See 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 54.77(2) at 1703; Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); United States Steel Corp. v.
United States, 519 F. 2d 359 (3rd Cir. 1975).
21. The English have been awarding attorney's fees as costs since 1275. See
Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation? 49 IowA L. REv. 75
(1963), for an article in which the author argues in favor of adopting a system like that
of the- English in which attorneys' fees would be considered costs of litigation. It is his
feeling that a great deal of the congestion in our courts is due to the present system in
which it is financially advantageous to go to court. A plaintiff may have a groundless
claim, but may realize financial advantage by going to court because the defendant will
often settle immediately for an amount that is less than the expenses of contesting the
case. A defendant may also realize an economic advantage by continuing the litigation,
even after realizing that he has no defense, or after judgment against him, to increase
the plaintiff's attorney's fees and hope to get the plaintiff to settle for less than the true
value of the case. In essence, the author feels that the present system represents an
expense to one litigant that results in economic advantage to the other. See also Note,
Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie? 20 VAND. L. REv. 1216 (1967.)
in which the author analyzes the historical reasons and philosophical basis for the
evolution of the "American Rule." The author believes that access to the courts without
fear of having to pay an opponent's fees is so deeply ingrained in our system that it is
often claimed that due process considerations demand retention of the American system
despite the many arguments and movements in favor of reform. The reform movement
is viewed as an outgrowth of a shift in emphasis from individualism to the importance
of society as a whole. At the heart of the reform movement lie two fundamental con-
cepts: the idea of resolving disputes by settlement and compromise rather than through
litigation, and the idea that justice demands that the aggrieved party be made whole
and that, to do so, attorney's fees must be included as damages.
301 113:1979
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been no adequate historical explanation for the departure from the
English Rule.Y It is interesting to note that, in early Colonial America,
most courts adopted the English Rule and costs and fees were awarded
to prevailing parties in actions at law.2 3 However, the underlying
philosophy was not that of full compensation for the wronged party,
and a ceiling was put on the amount of fees which could be awarded.
That ceiling was never raised to reflect increased costs. In addition,
new states joining the Union rarely provided for attorney's fees to be
taxed as costs and, if they did so provide, the award was merely per-
functory. Some commentators have concluded that "it was this process
of gradual forgetting rather than a deep-seated moral argument that
has apparently caused the abolition of the prevailing party's right to
the recovery of his counsel fees."24 Others have suggested that, because
the new government had to create a willingness in its citizens to
submit to the judicial system to resolve their disputes, there was a
conscious effort on the part of the new government not to create any
deterrents to the use of the courts, but to insure free access to them.2
Another reason often cited for the historical evolution of the Amer-
ican Rule is the spirit of individualism which permeated early American
life. As a consequence of this philosophical outlook, it was only natural
that parties involved in legal disputes would resolve the issues among
themselves. Theoretically, our system established a set of laws and pro-
cedures whereby every person would be able to represent himself ade-
quately without the need for an attorney.26 Hence, the feeling arose that
attorneys were "considered a luxury, rather than a necessity, [and] one
who wished to utilize their services should not be compensated for this
indiscretion." z Further,
the assertion of individual rights was so important to the early American
that litigation flourished and was encouraged under "[w]hat Dean Wig-
more has called the sporting theory of justice, the idea that judicial ad-
ministration of justice is a game to be played to the bitter end." Inherent
22. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney's Fees from Funds, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1598 (1974).
23. Note, Attorney's Fees: Where shall the Ultimate Burden Lie? 20 VAND. L.
REV. at 1218.
24. Id. at 1219, n. 17.
25. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation? 49 IOWA L.
REV. at 81.
26. Id.
27. Id.
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 17
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol3/iss1/17
Christianburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C.
1 3:1979
in the rules of this "sport" is the idea from which our rule on fees
developed, that is, the idea that each individual must bear whatever bur-
dens, including all costs, litigation might cause. 8
However, despite the general rule that attorney's fees are not taxed
as costs, Congress has provided limited exceptions and has madespe-
cific provisions for attorney's fees under certain federal statutes. These
statutory allowances can best be categorized in the following ways: (1)
those which make fee awards mandatory for prevailing plaintiffs;2 (2)
those which permit fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs" and (3) those
which are most flexible and leave it to the discretion of the court to
award attorney's fees to either plaintiffs or defendants.31 Section 706(k)
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 falls into the category which
allows the district court to exercise its discretion in awarding attorney's
fees to the prevailing party.
The Supreme Court, in arriving at a decision in Christianburg,
reviewed cases arising under the third category of statutes which allow
for awards of attorney's fees at the court's discretion. In rendering its
decision, the Court considered Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises."
28. Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie? 20 VAND. L.
REv. at 1220-21.
29. "See, e.g., The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15; the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f); the Truth
in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a); and the Merchant Marines Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C.
§ 1227." 434 U.S. at 415, n. 5.
30. "See, e.g., the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(g)(2)(B); Fair Housing
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c)." 434 U.S. at 416, n. 6.
31. "See, e.g., Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77000(d); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e) and 78r(a); Federal Water Pollution Preven-
tion and Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,
42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d); Waste Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (d)." 434 U.S. at
416, n. 7.
32. 390 U.S. 400 (1968). Piggie Park involved a class action brought under the
Public Accomodations portion of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, to enjoin racial discrimina-
tion at the defendant's drive-in restaurant and sandwich shop. The appellate court found
that the defendant had discriminated against Blacks at its shops. The issue before the
Supreme Court was whether or not the prevailing party was entitled to attorney's fees
under the applicable portions of the statute. (See note 33 infra). The Supreme Court,
in a frequently quoted opinion, found that the plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees
under the statute and that prevailing plaintiffs would usually be entitled to attorney's
fees unless there were exceptional circumstances which would render such an award
unjust. The Court based its decision on the theory that plaintiffs act in the shoes of the
government and often receive no monetary award for bringing such actions. They are
therefore entitled to be made whole. Id. at 402.
303[1
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which involved a statute almost identical to the one at issue in this
case. " In Piggie Park, the plaintiffs brought an action under Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.Y The plaintiffs prevailed and the
United States Court of Appeals instructed the district court to award
them attorney's fees "only to the extent that respondents' defenses had
been advanced for purposes of delay and not in good faith."'  The
Supreme Court in Piggie Park held, however, that a prevailing plaintiff
under this statute
should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances
would render such an award unjust . . . [because] . . . when a plaintiff
brings an action under that Title he cannot recover damages. If he obtains
an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a "private
attorney general" vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the
highest priority. 6
The Court also noted in Piggie Park that, if the intent of Congress was
only to allow prevailing plaintiffs to recover an award for attorney's fees
against a defendant who had acted in bad faith and made completely
groundless contentions for purposes of delay, it would not have been
necessary to create a new statutory provision because, under certain
judicially created exceptions, "it has long been held that a federal court
may award counsel fees to a successful plaintiff where a defense has
been maintained 'in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons."' 3 7 In light of the fact that no statute was necessary to award
attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff when the defendant's behavior
created a valid exceptional circumstance, the Court in Piggie Park con-
cluded that the statute was necessary to insure that a prevailing plaintiff
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b): "In any action commenced pursuant to this subchap-
ter, the Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be
liable for costs the same as a private person."
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, el. seq. This Act provides that "all persons shall be entitled
to full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and
accomodations of any place of public accomodation . . . without discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin."
The Act further allows for the bringing of a civil action for injunctive relief where
a party believes that someone is about to engage or has engaged in unlawful practices
pursuant to this Act.
35. 390 U.S. at 401.
36. Id. at 402.
37. Id. at 402, n. 4.
Nova Law Journal
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in a Title 1I action would, as a matter of course, be awarded a reasona-
ble attorney's fee, unless to do so would be unjust.3
In a subsequent case also cited in Christianburg, Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody,39 the Court made it clear that the standard enunciated
in Piggie Park for awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff.was
equally applicable to an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.40
Hence, it was established that, in actions arising under the category of
statutes which allow the district court to exercise discretion in awarding
attorney's fees to the prevailing party, the prevailing plaintiff should
ordinarily be awarded attorney's fees in all but special circumstances.
The principal case presented the Court with the question of what
standard should be applied in determining whether a successful de-
fendant in a Title VII action should be awarded attorney's fees. The
garment company, employer/defendant, contended that the same
standards which are applied to a prevailing plaintiff should equally
apply to a prevailing defendant. In other words, the garment company
espoused the theory that, barring circumstances which would make an
award unjust, prevailing defendants should receive attorney's fees as a
matter of course."1 On the other hand, the Commission/plaintiff argued
38. Id. at 402. See also Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040, 1045
(4th Cir. 1976), for an example of a situation where the court found special circum-
stances which would support a denial of attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiffs.
Retired male employees filed a lawsuit alleging sex discrimination in a retirement plan
which gave male retirees a smaller share of the retirement fund than similarly situated
female employees. The district court found the plan discriminatory but refused to award
attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the denial
of attorney's fees on the ground that the employer acted with reasonable speed to redress
its unintentional violation of the Act, once the violation became known, by amending
the plan to eliminate its illegally discriminatory aspects before plaintiffs' suits werefiled.
39. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). In this case, a certified class of present and former Black
employees brought an action against their employer and the employees' union, seeking
injunctive relief against any acts at the plant which violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. The
petitioners had argued that they were entitled to back pay, but the district court, relying
on Piggie Park, declined to grant it on the ground that there was no evidence of bad
faith non-compliance with the Act. The Supreme Court, however, refused to apply
Piggie Park to an award of back pay, stating, "[tlhere is, of course, an equally strong
public interest in having injunctive actions brought under Title VII, to eradicate discrim-
inatory employment practices. But this interest can be vindicated by applying the Piggie
Park standard to the attorney's fees provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-
5(k)." Id. at 415.
40. Id.
41. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Bailey Co., Inc., 563 F.
2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Industries, Inc., 558 F. 2d
742 (5th Cir. 1977) for examples of federal courts which have expressed the same view
as the defendant company/employer in this case.
305 11 3:1979
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that prevailing defendants should receive an award of attorney's fees
only if the plaintiff acted in bad faith. The Supreme Court did not
agree with either position. The Court indicated that the language of
the statute is permissive and discretionary and neither invites, nor
requires, the mechanical application which the defendant garment
company sought to impose. The Court, relying once again on its deci-
sion in Piggie Park, pointed out that there are equitable considerations
which favor an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff which
do not apply to a prevailing defendant. In distinguishing the equities
involved, the Court noted that the plaintiff is viewed as the chosen
"instrument of Congress to vindicate 'a policy that Congress con-
sidered of the highest priority' "42 and that, when an award for attor-
ney's fees is given in a Title VII action to a prevailing plaintiff, it is
awarded against a violator of federal law. 3
The Court found that the legislative debate indicated that the public
policy behind allowing an award of attorney's fees is to facilitate the
bringing of meritorious suits." Reasonable attorney's fees are frequently
awarded to private litigants to encourage compliance with the well-
recognized Congressional policy of having Title VII enforced, to a large
extent, by individuals acting as "private attorneys general."' Under the
"private attorney general" theory, prevailing plaintiffs are viewed as
having vindicated a policy that Congress considered of the highest prior-
42. 434 U.S. at 419.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Carey v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 467 (D.C. La. 1973). The
plaintiff, James Carey, brought a lawsuit against the defendants, Greyhound and the
local unions, alleging racial discrimination and seeking an injunction to prevent the
defendants from interfering with his right to equal employment opportunity. He also
sought a provision for change in the seniority system, an award for back pay and
attorney's fees. The court found that the defendants had engaged in unlawful employ-
ment discrimination and required a change in the seniority system. Although it declined
to grant back pay to the plaitiff, it did award attorney's fees. In justifying the award,
the court stated:
Notably, the awarding of attorney's fees is not conditioned on a finding that the
Title VII defendant has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment prac-
tice. Reasonable attorney's fees are frequently awarded to private litigants in
order to encourage compliance with the well recognized Congressional policy of
having Title VII enforced to a large extent by individuals acting as "private
attorneys general." In view of this policy of citizen enforcement, plaintiff is
entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees ...
Id. at 474.
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ity. If plaintiffs are forced to bear their attorneys' fees in every case,
perhaps few aggrieved parties would be in a position to seek judicial
reliefd. In addition, the right of a plaintiff to recover an attorney's fee
under Section 706(k) has been held not to be affected by the fact that
the plaintiff instituted the action under Title VII as a "test case," 7 or
that the defenses presented were not entirely without merit,4" or that
there was no intentional violation of the Act by the defendant in that
he acted in good faith reliance on, or compliance with, a state statute.
49
46. 390 U.S. at 402.
47. Lea v. Cone Mills, Corp., 438 F. 2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971). In this case, the Black
female plaintiff sued under Title VII, alleging that the defendant, Cone Mills Corpora-
tion, had failed to hire Black females, although it hired Black males and white females.
The plaintiffs prevailed on the merits and obtained an injunction against the unfair
practices, thus opening the way for employment of Black women in defendant's plant.
The appellate court awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiffs and, in so doing, stated:
Plaintiffs prevailed on the merits. They not only obtained an injunction against
unfair employment practices but also opened the way for employment of Negro
women in the Cone Mills plant. True, specific employment was not sought, and
even if the application was solely a predicate for this suit, these facts ought not
defeat the claim for attorney's fees. This pronouncement upon their rights, and
the requirement of Cone Mills to observe them in the future, were ordered in
implementation of the Equal Employment Opportunities Act. Plaintiffs should
not be denied attorney's fees merely because theirs was a "test case."
id. at 88.
48. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F. 2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971). In this case, the
district court found that the defendant's seniority system violated the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities Act but declined to award attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiffs.
The defendants had claimed that they were justified in discriminating because of an
overriding legitimate purpose in maintaining the racially discriminating practice. The
district court, in denying plaintiffs an award of attorney's fees, stated: "While more
meritorious defenses have in some cases been presented, the defenses here cannot be
fairly characterized as extreme. Therefore, the Court declines to award counsel fees as
part of the costs for the plaintiffs." Id. at 804. See also 319 F. Supp. 835, 843 (M.D.N.C.
1971).
The plaintiffs appealed the denial of attorney's fees. The appellate court reversed
and awarded attorney's fees, noting that: "[Aittorney's fees are to be imposed not only
to penalize defendants for pursuing frivolous arguments, but to encourage individuals
to vindicate the strongly expressed Congressional policy against racial discrimination."
444 F. 2d at 804.
49. LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1971).
The defendant telephone company, pursuant to a Louisiana statute, refused to allow
female employees to work more than eight hours per day or forty-eight hours per week.
An action was brought against the telephone company by female employees charging
unlawful discrimination in employment. The district court held that the Louisiana stat-
ute had been preempted by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and, therefore, the plaintiffs
! 3:97
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The Supreme Court, as indicated above, did not find merit in the
viewpoint of the Commission that a prevailing defendant could recover
attorney's fees only if the plaintiff had acted in bad faith. Instead, the
Court recognized that Congress "also wanted to protect defendants
from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis""0 and in-
tended to award attorney's fees to help defendants defend against frivo-
lous and factually baseless actions.51 A defendant seeking attorney's fees
relies on equitable considerations other than the plaintiff's "private
attorney general" theory. An award for the defendant is conditioned
upon such considerations as the propriety of the plaintiff's conduct and
whether there was vexatiousness, bad faith, abusive conduct or an at-
tempt on the part of the plaintiff to harass or embarrass the defendant."
prevailed and were awarded attorney's fees. On appeal, defendants argued that they had
relied in good faith upon the state statute and should not be held liable for a failure to
predict that the statute would be deemed unconstitutional. The appellate court upheld
the award of attorney's fees and stated:
There is no requirement that the prevailing party be the victim of intentional
discrimination. The courts have uniformly awarded attorney's fees in these cases
even where the prevailing party was unable to recover back pay or other damages
because the defendant was relying in good faith on a state statute. . .This is a
recognition of the Congressional purpose to have Title VII enforced in large part
by the individuals wronged acting as private attorneys general . . . Awarding
attorney's fees to the prevailing party is one way of insuring that this Congres-
sional intent will be effectuated and that individuals will not be deterred from
bringing Title VII suits. These plaintiffs have been the victims of an unlawful
employment practice, it is only fair that they be allowed to recover the considera-
ble sums they have expended to vindicate not only their rights but also the rights
of many other working women.
Id. at 611.
50. 434 U.S. at 420.
51. See Lee v. Chesapeake & O.R. Co., 389 F. Supp. 84 (D. Md. 1975). An
employee brought suit against the railroad company and a local labor union under the
equal employment provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiff admitted that
he had no reasonable grounds to believe that the union had discriminated against him
because of his race. Having prevailed on motions for summary judgment, the defendant
union sought attorney's fees. The court, in granting them, quoted from Paddison v.
Fidelity Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695, 699 (E.D. Pa. 1973):
While a defendant does not act as a "private attorney general" in a Title VII
action,. . . a prevailing defendant is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) when required to defend against a frivolous or
factually baseless action brought under Title VII . . . "[sluch an award [of attor-
ney's fees] would normally be made to prevailing defendants only if the case
had been unreasonably brought. . ..
389 F. Supp. at 85.
52. See, e.g., Robinson v. KMOX-TV, CBS Television Station, 407 F. Supp.
10
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The Court, in rendering its decision in Christianburg, was influ-
enced by two recent circuit court cases. In one, United States Steel
Corporation v. United States,3 the court denied an award of attorney's
fees to a successful defendant while, in the other, Carrion v. Yeshiva
University,5 the court upheld the award to a successful defendant. .The
significance of these cases is the court's application of the same standard
in arriving at different results: that the action must have been
"unreasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious"5 and not merely
brought in bad faith. To define these abstract words, the Court in
Christianburg said:
"[mleritless" is to be understood as meaning groundless or without foun-
dation, rather than simply that the plaintiff has ultimately lost his case,
and that the term "vexatious" in no way implies that the plaintiff's
subjective bad faith is a necessary prerequisite to a fee award against him.
In sum, a District Court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to a
prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plain-
tiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, even
though not brought in subjective bad faith.,
1272 (E.D. Mo. 1975). In this case, the defendant did everything possible to expedite
the lawsuit and to cooperate with the plaintiff so that the plaintiff would have prompt
adjudication of his claim. However, the plaintiff failed to pursue discovery after the
defendant had voluntarily waived time limits set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the suit was dismissed for plaintiff's failure to proceed. In light of the
plaintiff's conduct, attorney's fees were awarded to the defendant. See also Matyi v.
Beer Bottlers Union 1187, 392 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Mo. 1974), where the defendant was
awarded attorney's fees where, prior to the filing of the lawsuit, the plaintiff had filed
charges of illegal discrimination with the National Labor Relations Board, Missouri
Commission on Human Rights, and the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission,
and each of these agencies had determined that the plaintiff's charges were without
merit.
53. 519 F. 2d 359 (3rd Cir. 1975). The appellate court upheld the denial of
attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant (U.S. Steel) in a Title VII action on the
grounds that the Commission's actions were "a bona fide effort to seek information and
there is nothing to indicate that the demand for access was brought to harass, embarrass
or abuse either the petitioner [U.S. Steel, the defendant below] or the enforcement
process, nor can we say [the E.E.O.C.'s] action was unfounded, meritless, frivolous
or vexatiously brought." Id. at 363.
54. 535 F. 2d 722 (2nd Cir. 1976). In this case, attorney's fees were awarded to a
prevailing defendant because the plaintiff had previously brought substantially similar
charges in state court and, in that suit, the trial judge determined that the plaintiff had
perjured herself. In addition, the court of appeals concluded that the suit was motivated
by malice and vindictiveness.
55. Id. at 727, 519 F. 2d at 363.
56. 434 U.S. at 421.
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The Court's decision sets a standard which allows for the award of
attorney's fees to the defendant in a Title VII action even if the plaintiff
did not act in bad faith. This would mandate the imposition of attor-
ney's fees against the plaintiff if that plaintiff continued to litigate after
it became clear that the claim was groundless, frivolous or unreasona-
ble.5 This is logically consistent with past precedent. If bad faith was
the sole standard, it would not have been necessary for Congress to
statutorily provide for an award of attorney's fees since the common law
already provides that a prevailing party is entitled to such an award if
the opposing party acts in bad faith."
There are few areas of uncertainty left by the Christianburg deci-
sion. The Court has laid the foundation for an increase in the number
of awards of attorney's fees to prevailing defendants by clarifying the
standards for allowing their recovery and by formulating a standard
which is not grounded solely on the bad faith of the plaintiff. This could,
for example, provide a tremendous advantage to a small business-
man/defendant with limited finances who is forced to pay a substantial
cost in defending a frivolous, unreasonable and groundless lawsuit. If
such a defendant is confident of his legal position, he can aggressively
defend against frivolous or nuisance suits with the knowledge that, if he
prevails, he will recover his attorney's fees.
By setting a reasonable standard for plaintiff's liability for defen-
dant's legal fees in Title VII actions, the Court's decision may cause
prospective litigants to stop and think before commencing an action or
asserting a defense. It may thus serve as a deterrent to bringing frivo-
lous, time-consuming litigation, and court congestion may ultimately be
reduced. Perhaps the threat of having to pay the winning party's attor-
ney's fee will even encourage out-of-court settlements and/or compli-
ance with Title VII. However, inherent in the decision is the risk that
the fear of having to pay double attorney's fees may keep meritorious
litigants, especially the poor, from seeking relief through the courts.
The fact remains, though, that as a result of the Christianburg
decision, the Supreme Court has established a double standard for the
recovery of attorney's fees in Title VII actions. The Court has affirmed
that it is easier for prevailing plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees than
57. Id. at 422.
58. See Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923) and
Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962), for examples of cases where, in the absence
of a statutory provision, the prevailing party received attorney's fees based on the fact
'that the opposing party had acted in bad faith.
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for prevailing defendants. 9 The prevailing plaintiff receives the award
as a matter of course (barring exceptional circumstances which would
make such an award unjust), despite the fact that the defendant is able
to present a meritorious, albeit unsuccessful, defense." On the other
hand, the prevailing defendant's right to an award is conditioned upon
a finding that the plaintiff's "claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or
groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly
became so. And,. . . if a plaintiff is found to have brought or continued
such a claim in bad faith, there will be an even stronger basis for
charging him with the attorney's fees incurred by the defense."',
Marilyn Liroff
59. The Supreme Court, in footnote 20 of its opinion, recognized that some courts
considered that there should be a distinction between awarding attorney's fees against
a losing private plaintiff and against the Commission as a losing plaintiff. However, the
Court rejected this idea and indicated that the same standard should apply.
60. Supra note 48.
61. 434 U.S. at 422.
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